The Ethnographers' Fight--by ILC

The power of epistemology in officiating human knowledge cannot be overstated. In essence, its role is to question the nature and origin of what humans think they know. Regardless of how indisputable theories and claims may be, this philosophy branch always serves as a skeptic. Extremely put, it suggests there is always a chance everything ever known is a lie. Seems like an unpleasant thought. Unfortunately for ethnography, epistemology does not pull any punches in critiquing its participation in studying refugees. Heath Cabot, Matthew Gibney, and Lisa Malkki make a perfect tag team relentlessly beating ethnographic paradigms until they tap out. Based on their work, there is no denying epistemic changes to studying refugees are necessary. However, despite the bruises and black eye suffered by ethnography, can certain, current methods still be valid in generating knowledge on refugees? With the proper stitching and adrenaline flowing, a comeback could be on.

First-hand knowledge is still a relevant method. When ethnographers and professionals do field work which involves visiting camps or talking to refugees, they use their sense perception to process information, make relevant observations, and provide statistics about their experiences. Our senses are the innate tools used to understand the world around us. Evidently, field work will always be useful for learning about the lives of refugees because their reality is directly exposed to the ethnographer. These experiences also challenge ethnographer’s preconceptions and make them learn from them. For example, Michel Agier’s numerous anecdotes on refugee camps show her expertise on their functioning. First-hand knowledge can be referred to as a posteriori knowledge. Its complement, a priori, is also important.

A priori knowledge enables a better understanding of refugee problems too. It refers to knowledge gained through reason. While first-hand knowledge is useful, ethnographers must also be able to use logic and have an expertise on ethnographic principles to explain, understand, and solve current, refugee situations. These principles help with holistic and general analyses, and their validity can be confirmed by their relevance and truthfulness in explaining refugee dilemmas. For example, Gibney uses reason to further the conceptualisation of refugees based on not just the threat they face, but also the extent to which they can be protected from this threat. To keep a priori and a posteriori knowledge in check, ethnographers must also be reflective.

Constantly scrutinising ethnographic practices leads to a betterment of the field. Heath Cabot is extremely critical of her own practices by discussing the importance of ‘not knowing’ in her work, that there is never full certainty to a refugee’s story. This critique is an essential epistemic practice which ensures that ethnographic ways of knowing are constantly evolving and margins of error are accounted for.

It seems the combination of the aforementioned forms of knowledge, as well as many others, coupled with the constant evaluation of them, is the key for keeping all forms of knowledge in balance and ensuring the development of ethnography as a study. With this formula, ethnographers could confidently step into the ring and battle with future refugee crisis toe to toe.